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An analysis of the Utah capital felony sentencing 
statute reveals that no provision has been made to insure 
that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth 
in the statute were properly considered by the sentencing 
authority. The statute does not compel the making of any 
written findings as to any of the factors set forth. It 
appears that the trial court or jury could disregard any or 
all of the mitigating factors and the defendant would be at 
a loss as to the factors which influenced the judgment im-
posed. The trial court or jury is insulated from having to 
justify its decision on the sentence imposed. This inherent 
defect permits the same opportunity for the arbitrariness 
and caprice condemned by the Furman decision, and meaningful 
appellate review of the sentence imposed is thereby precluded. 
The reviewing court has nothing to refer to in determining 
whether the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were 
properly considered, or considered at all, or whether the 
sentence imposed was the result of passion or prejudice. 
In July of 1976 the United States Supreme Court 
rendered five landmark decisions dealing with the death 
penalty, three of which have direct application to the 
instant case. The Court appears to have concerned itself 
with the measures taken by each state to insure the integrity 
of the sentence imposed. The Court was not safisfied merely 
with whether the statute in each state permited consideration 
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of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but con-
stantly made reference to additional procedural safe-
guards such as provision for automatic appellate review of 
each death sentence, requiring the making of written find-
ings to support a sentence of death mandatory, or whether 
the evidence supported such findings, and whether the 
sentence imposed was disproportionate compared to those 
sentences imposed in similar cases. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, U.S.49 L.Ed.2d 859,96 S.Ct, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Georgia death penalty statute and made reference to sev-
eral of the safeguards referred to above. Specifically, the 
jury in Georgia is required to find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance before recommending a sentence of death. The 
Georgia statute also provides for automatic appeal of all 
death sentences to the State Supreme Court. On review,the 
Court is required by statute to "review each sentence of 
death and determine whether it was imposed under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence 
supports the jury's findings of statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate 
compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases." 
In Proffitt v. Florida U.S. 49 L.Ed.2a 913,96 S.Ct. 
United States Supreme Court upheld the consitutionality of 
thatstate's death penalty by stating that the sentencing 
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Judge is required to impose the death penalty on all first 
degree murderers as to whom the statutory aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors. The statute 
requires that if the trial court imposes a sentence of 
death, 
"it shall set forth in writing its findings 
upon which the sentence of death is based as 
to the facts: (a) that sufficient statutory 
aggravating circumstances exist..,(b) that 
there are insufficient statutory mitigating 
circumstances." Fla. Stat. Ann.Sec.921.141(3) 
It should also be noted that the Florida statute pro-
vides for automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida 
in all cases where the death sentence has been imposed. 
Fla.Stat. Ann. Sec. 921.141(4). As a result of the above 
provisions, meaningful appellate review of each sentence of 
death is made possible since the judge must justify the 
imposition of the death sentence with written findings. 
In Jurek v. Texas, U.S.49L.Ed.2d 576, 96 S.Ct., the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the Texas statute which 
required that after a verdict finding a person guilty of one 
of five specified murder categories the jury must answer the 
following three questions: 
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that 
caused the death of the deceased was committed 
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation 
that the death of the deceased or another would 
result; 
"(2) whether there is a probability that the defen-
dant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and 
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M(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct 
of the defendant in killing the deceased was un-
reasonable response to the provocation, if any by 
the deceased." Texas Code Crim.Proc.,Art.37.071(b) 
The death sentence is imposed if the jury finds that the 
State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer 
to each of the three questions is yes; a sentence of life 
imprisonment results if it finds that the answer to any 
question is in the negative. Thus, the sentence of death 
in Texas is dependent upon the jury making a specific find-
ing of yes or no as to each of the three questions involved. 
The Texas statute also provides for an expedited review by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
By comparing the capital sentencing statutes of 
Georgia, Florida and Texas with the Utah statute in question, 
Sec. 76-3-207, it is apparent that the framers were remiss 
in failing to incorporate into the statute language of a 
mandatory nature requiring that the sentencing authority give 
proper consideration to the mitigating factors and that it 
justify its determination of death by written findings. 
The transcript in the instant case reveals that the 
trial court in reaching it's decision to impose the death 
penalty on appellant addressed itself to only one of the 
mitigating factors set forth in Section 76-3-207, to wit: 
(d) at the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongful-
ness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
-5-
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the requirement of law was substantially 
impaired as a result of mental disease, 
intoxication, or influence of drugs. (See T.647) 
The Court apparently did not take into consideration 
or even discuss the other mitigating circumstances contained 
in that section and which the court had a duty to consider. 
The Court made no reference to the young age of appellant, 
stated to be between 20 and 22 years of age at the time of 
the crime; made no reference to the minimal participation 
by appellant in the crime; and made no reference to the 
deprived background of appellant. These were all proper 
areas of inquiry which should have been addressed by the 
Court and which should have entered into the decision as to 
life imprisonment or death. The failure of the Court to 
set forth in writing any findings, or to set forth in its 
justification of the death penalty, (T. 645-650) has the 
effect of withholding from the reviewing court information 
necessary to determine whether the sentence imposed was the 
result of passion or prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits that Section 
76-3-207 Utah Code Annotated is unconstitutional since 
it does not embody adequate procedural safeguards to 
insure that arbitrariness and caprice do not enter into 
the sentence imposed. The statute does not meet the test 
of the Furman decision and does not contain the procedural 
safeguards alluded to in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. 
The judgment rendered at trial should be reversed 
and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial, 
or in the alternative, an Order should be issued setting 
aside the sentence of death and remanding the cause to the 
trial court for the imposition of the sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of September,1976 
I personally served upon the Attorney General of the State of 
Utah three copies of the above and foregoing Amended and 
Supplemental Brief of Appellant by personally delivering said 
three copies to the office of the Attorney General. 
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